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Abstract 
 
To what degree developing countries gain from signing double tax treaties is being hotly 
debated. In this paper, we analyze the Austrian tax treaty policy. Combining legal and 
economic perspectives, we find that developing countries are likely to expect both positive 
and negative impacts from signing a double tax treaty (DTT) with Austria. On the one hand, 
the results of our econometric analysis suggest that middle-income countries that sign a DTT 
with Austria may expect an increased number of foreign direct investment projects from 
Austrian companies. On the other hand, the signatory states may suffer from limited 
withholding taxation rights established in the DTTs for the source country, which could lead 
to reduced tax revenues in the developing countries. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past years, there has been an increasing awareness that governments are losing 
substantial tax revenues due to “aggressive” tax avoidance schemes. The G20 and the OECD 
strongly promote the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting initiative (BEPS), which aims at 
undermining aggressive tax planning structures used by multinational companies. The BEPS 
initiative claims that „fixing‟ some individual problems of the current international tax rules 
suffices to solve the problems of tax avoidance.
1
 
At the same time, there is a different discussion coming from the perspective of 
developing countries, calling for more fundamentally „rethinking‟ the international tax 
system. The question is raised how the international tax system in general and Double Tax 
Treaties (DTTs) in particular impact developing countries. It is also being discussed whether 
developing countries at all benefit from the signature of DTTs under the current 
internationally accepted standards. It is not merely a theoretical discussion, but some 
developing countries have already terminated specific DTTs that they do not perceive as 
beneficial for themselves.2  
Traditionally, DTTs are signed to avoid double taxation that results when two or more 
countries intend to tax the same income.3 Moreover, it is often claimed that DTTs, which also 
provide mechanisms to exchange information between the tax authorities of the signatory 
states, can help to prevent tax avoidance and evasion. Additionally, countries may see DTTs 
as legally binding instruments that provide legal certainty for their resident companies, and 
may thus promote international business expansion. Further, developing countries may sign 
DTTs in order to signal to the international community their willingness to accept 
internationally accepted tax rules and their openness to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). 
However, objections are arising regarding the usefulness of DTTs for developing countries: 
their effectiveness in attracting new investment is put into question and fears of major tax 
revenue losses for developing countries are growing. 
This ongoing debate motivates the present study, which analyses the Austrian DTT 
network with developing countries.4 Austria‟s 36 DTTs signed with various developing 
                                                     
1
 OECD (2013), p.11: …„While actions to address BEPS – base erosion and profit shifting - will restore both 
source and residence taxation in a number of cases where cross-border income would otherwise go untaxed or 
would be taxed at very low rates, these actions are not directly aimed at changing the existing international 
standards on the allocation of taxing rights on cross-border income.” 
2
 For instance, Mongolia has recently terminated its DTT with the Netherlands and in 2008 Argentina has 
terminated its DTT with Austria. 
3
 Lang (2013), p. 29; Daurer (2013), p. 8. 
4
 For the purpose of this study, we define developing countries as countries that received Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) in 2012/13. The list of ODA-recipients is taken from ÖFSE (2012), p. 123. 
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countries (see Table 3 in Section 5) are based on the internationally accepted standards, as 
embodied in the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (henceforth OECD 
Model). This study investigates in detail how these DTTs impact developing countries.  
Our research builds on an interdisciplinary approach, combining both a legal and an 
economic perspective. The legal analysis (Section 2) explicates Austria‟s international tax 
policy with a main focus on its DTTs. In particular, the specific provisions regarding the 
allocation of taxing rights in the Austrian DTTs and their potential effect on developing 
countries are discussed. In the economic part (Section 3), we firstly give a brief overview on 
the Austrian FDI activity in developing countries and subsequently analyze econometrically 
to what degree DTTs contribute to encourage Austrian foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
developing countries.5 Section 4 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Austria’s DTT Network with Developing Countries 
2.1. General Remarks on Austria’s International Tax Policy  
Austria is a small Central European economy that depends on its international 
economic relations to prosper. As designing its own tax system is a pillar stone of every 
country‟s sovereignty,6 Austria tailors its tax policy to achieve two main goals, to: (i) support 
the international expansion of its domestic firms and, (ii) make itself attractive as a business 
location for the headquarters of multinational enterprises (MNEs).  
Since 2005, Austria has introduced a generous group taxation regime in its domestic 
law.7 Under this regime, losses made by non-resident companies can be deducted and added 
to the tax liability of a group of related companies in Austria.8 Moreover, Austria has also 
implemented provisions regarding the taxation of outbound payments of dividends and 
interest, aiming to attract regional headquarters to Austria. With regards to dividends, Austria 
has introduced a participation exemption scheme (Schachtelprivileg), in which outgoing 
dividends are exempt from taxation if the receiving company is an EU resident and holds at 
                                                     
5
 DTTs cover taxes on income and capital and affect both individuals and corporations. Thus, our analysis deals 
with these types of taxes. While the legal analysis examines mainly the effects of DTTs on businesses, but also 
touches upon their effects on individuals, the economic analysis focuses on the effect of DTTs on multinational 
corporations. 
6
 See Lang (2013), p. 27. 
7
 See §9 KStG (Körperschaftssteuergesetz) for a definition of a group („Unternehmensgruppe“).  
8
 The Tax Law Amendment Act 2014 revises the scope of the group taxation regime. From 1 March 2014, only 
non-Austrian resident companies, which are either resident in another EU country or in a non EU-country 
provided that Austria concluded a comprehensive mutual assistance agreement with such non-EU country, are 
eligible for the group tax regime. IBFD News, report on 17 January 2014. 
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least a 10% stake in the Austrian company.9 Further, interest payments to non-residents are, 
under certain circumstances, not subject to withholding tax.10 
Austria seems to be quite successful in attracting foreign investors. According to the 
Austrian Business Agency, about 300 foreign firms have established regional headquarters to 
serve the Central and Eastern European (CEE) markets and over 1,000 MNEs coordinate their 
CEE activities from a base in Austria.
11
 Evidently, there are good economic reasons to invest 
in Austria, or to use Austria as a location for regional headquarters (see Section 3.3). Yet, 
Austria‟s favourable tax system may arguably also play a role in a company‟s decision to 
invest in Austria. 
Austria also positions itself as an attractive location for Special Purpose Entities, or 
SPEs. These are entities with little economic activity in Austria, which are used to manage the 
flow of funds within a multinational group.12 In 2011, SPEs made up about a third of Austria‟s 
outbound and inbound FDI stocks.13 These structures seem to be successful in investing 
indirectly in other countries. Some SPEs might arguably also be used only for tax planning 
purposes “to channel investments and intra-group financing from one country to another 
through conduit structures”.14 Weyzig (2012), for instance, provides empirical evidence that 
such SPEs are used for treaty shopping via the Netherlands.15
 
 
Apart from the favorable features of the domestic tax system for MNEs, another 
essential factor of Austria‟s attractiveness as a business location is its large DTT network.16 
Austria, which has one of the longest traditions in settling DTTs,17 has a large DTT network, 
which as of July 2014 consists of 86 DTTs, 36 of which are with developing countries.18 
Austria‟s DTT network reflects its policy focus of (re)negotiating treaties with countries with 
                                                     
9 see IBFD Tax Research Platform, Country Analysis, International Aspects “with effect from 1 January 2005, 
dividend distributions by resident subsidiaries to non-resident EU parent companies are exempt from 
withholding tax under the following conditions:  (i) the parent company has a form listed in the Directive; (ii) the 
parent company is resident in another EU Member State; (iii) the parent company owns at least 10% of the 
capital in the subsidiary; and  (iv) the shareholding has been held directly (or indirectly, with effect from 1 April 
2012) and continuously for at least 1 year.   
10
 The Tax Law Amendment Act 2014, effective as of 1 March 2014, also revises the taxation of interest. Non-
resident tax-exempt interest payments now include any interest payment as defined in the Savings Directive. 
11
 ABA (n.d.)  
12
 OECD (2013), p.18. The OECD defines SPEs as “entities with no or few employees, little or no physical 
presence in the host economy, whose assets and liabilities represent investments in or from other countries, and 
whose core business consists of group financing or holding activities”. Besides Austria, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and Hungary are other OECD countries that attract a large amount of SPEs. 
13
 OeNB (2012), p. 10. 
14
 OECD (2013), p.18. 
15
 see Weyzig (2012). 
16
 Loukota (1998).  
17
 Freiherr von Roenne (2011), pp. 24-26. 
18
 https://www.bmf.gv.at/steuern/int-steuerrecht/oesterreichische-doppelbesteuerungsabkommen.html (accessed 
on the 1st August 2014). 
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which it has close economic ties. Accordingly, Austria‟s DTT network with developing 
countries in Asia is quite narrow, but it has very few DTTs with African and Latin American 
countries.19 Only five DTTs with countries in Latin America and one DTT with a sub-Saharan 
country (namely South Africa) are in place.20 
While formerly, Austrian DTT negotiators primarily aimed to boost tax revenues for 
Austria,21 increasing the attractiveness of Austria as a business location is now seen as the 
main function of its DTTs.22 The Austrian Ministry of Finance strives to guarantee a “level 
playing field” for Austrian investors in the host countries where they operate. This means that 
Austrian MNEs – that includes both Austrian and foreign MNEs with established 
headquarters in Austria – should face a legal environment not less favourable than other 
MNEs.23  
In order to ensure a uniform international tax policy in its DTT network, Austria has 
established a DTT Model that is very close to the OECD Model, which is – needless to say – 
designed by its members, which are primarily high-income countries.24 Hence, the OECD 
Model reflects the international tax policy interests of its members.25 As this Model favors the 
residence principle, which means that tax residents of a country are subject to tax on their 
worldwide income, generally speaking, it allocates a greater portion of taxation rights to a 
residence country.26 This is either achieved by granting exclusive taxation rights to a residence 
country or by reducing taxation rights in a source country. The following section analyzes 
Austria‟s DTT policy more in detail. 
2.2 Austria’s International Tax Treaty Policy 
With its DTTs, Austria pursues four goals, namely to: (i) prevent international double 
taxation, (ii) foster bilateral economic relations, (iii) increase legal certainty, and (iv) prevent 
international tax avoidance and evasion.27 From Austria‟s perspective, the main purpose of 
                                                     
19
 See Roller (2012), p. 220, “less than four per cent of all Austrian exports and less than two per cent of all 
Austrian imports are with African and Latin American countries”; see also see Section 3.2. 
20
 Roller (2012), p. 220.  
21
 Loukota, Seitz, Toifl (2004), p. 364. 
22
 Lang (2012), p. 116. This can also be observed in the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, which is 
responsible for promoting good business, being closely involved in advising the government in the DTT 
negotiation process (Lang, 2012, p 125). 
23
 Jirousek (2013a), p. 17.  
24
 Currently, there are 34 OECD member countries. This list includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. 
25
 Rixen and Schwartz (2009), p. 446. 
26
 Daurer (2013), p. 22. 
27
 Loukota, Seitz, Toifl (2004), p. 364. 
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DTTs is to avoid double taxation.28 Austria is a classical “exemption country”, i.e. it prefers to 
apply the exemption method as a mechanism to avoid double taxation.29 Under the exemption 
method, a “residence country” (i.e., a country where a company or an individual is considered 
to be a tax resident) is obliged to exclude income arising abroad (the “source country”) from 
the taxable base to determine the tax due. Thereby, it ensures that a company or an individual 
investing abroad is subject to the same tax burden as a national competitor investing at home 
(this principle is known as Capital Import Neutrality).30  
Many countries have managed to prevent double taxation through comprehensive 
domestic legislation by including the credit or the exemption method in their legislation.31 
Also Austria‟s domestic tax law provides for double taxation relief, that is fairly similar to the 
relief provided under its DTTs. The exemption method under Austria‟s domestic law applies 
to active income, such as income derived from businesses carried on through a permanent 
establishment (PE) situated abroad, subject to tax of at least 15%.32  
The credit method, on the other hand, requires that a residence country firstly 
computes the tax due on their residents‟ worldwide income, and subsequently the tax due is 
reduced by the taxes previously paid in a source country. As is standard with most exemption 
countries, Austria applies this method to passive income (i.e. dividends, interest and 
royalties). However, with no obvious differences between the methods to avoid double 
taxation under Austria‟s DTTs and its domestic tax law, signing a DTT seems not to be 
necessary for Austrian tax residents to avoid international double taxation.33   
For Austria, a second purpose of DTTs is fostering economic relations. In order to 
support the expansion of its domestic firms, it is crucial from the Austrian perspective to 
negotiate a DTT that reduces source taxation on passive income like dividends, interest and 
royalties as much as possible, even below the standards embodied in the OECD Model (see 
                                                     
28
 Jirousek (2013a), p. 19.  
29
 See IBFD Tax Research Platform, Country Analysis, International Aspects “The provisions on unilateral 
double taxation relief were issued on 17 December 2002 as a Decree of the Minister of Finance (Verordnung des 
Bundesministers für Finanzen betreffend die Vermeidung von Doppelbesteuerungen, BGBl II 2002/474) on the 
basis of the authority given in section 48 of the Federal Fiscal Code (BAO). These provisions are effective for 
tax years ending in the calendar year 2002 and later tax years. Previously, double taxation relief could be 
obtained as a concession of the Minister of Finance (section 48 of the BAO). 
30
 See Lang (2013), p. 131. 
31
 Daurer (2013), pp. 10-11. See also OECD (2014a), Public Discussion Draft – BEPS Action 6: Preventing the 
Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, p. 5. This draft recommends countries to take into 
account tax policy considerations before entering into a DTT by “… evaluating the extent to which the risk of 
double taxation actually exists in cross-border situations involving their residents. A large number of cases of 
residence-source juridical double taxation can be eliminated through domestic provisions for the relief of double 
taxation (ordinarily in the form of either the exemption or credit method) which operate without the need for tax 
treaties.”; also see Rixen and Schwartz (2009), p. 445. 
32 Not all DTTs, however, follow the exemption method. Austrian DTTs that follow the credit method are mostly 
with countries that used to be seen as tax havens, such as Bahrain, Barbados, or Belize (Lang, 2012, p. 22). 
33
 Loukota, Seitz, Toifl (2004), p. 364. 
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Section 2.3.2). Usually, a source country is granted the primary, albeit reduced taxation right 
(except for royalties under Article 12 OECD Model), and a residence country taxes the 
remaining amount. Typically, a DTT stipulates a lower tax rate on passive income than a 
countries‟ domestic law would establish.  The domestic tax law of many countries stipulates 
source taxation for this type of income at a flat tax rate higher than 15%,34 whereas DTTs 
typically reduce such tax rate to 15% or less.35 
The third goal of Austrian DTTs is to provide legal certainty. DTTs set common rules 
applicable in both a residence and a source country, and thus provide legal certainty for 
investors and tax administrations.36 From the perspective of a residence country, legal 
certainty is crucial to protect its residents investing abroad from international tax conflicts, 
giving rise to unsolved double taxation. From a source country‟s perspective, legal certainty 
would serve as an indicator that a foreign investor would be subject to comprehensive 
taxation rules. 
In order to provide increased certainty, Austria tries to ensure that DTT provisions are 
interpreted in the same way in both the residence and the source country. Austria insists on 
including a provision in the DTT protocol stating that DTT provisions should be interpreted 
according to the OECD Commentaries, which are revised periodically.37 Thus, Austria 
ensures that the latest version of the OECD Commentaries is legally binding and applicable 
for taxpayers, tax authorities and, even in the courts of signatory countries.38 
Fourth, preventing international tax avoidance and evasion is a major concern for 
Austria and, for that matter, an increasingly important goal for many governments in recent 
years. Tax avoidance is not, per se, an illegal way to reduce taxes due, this term usually refers 
to “unacceptable” taxpayer behavior: although complying with the letter of the law (i.e. literal 
interpretation), a taxpayer deliberately acts against the sprit or the intention of the law with 
                                                     
34
 See Vann (1998), p. 46. 
35
 Under the OECD Model, a source country is entitled to the following withholding tax rate on passive income: 
for dividends 5% and 15% (depending on the stake in the company), for interest 10% and for royalties 0%. In 
contrast, the UN Model does not provide specific withholding tax rates, but recommends the signatory states to 
negotiate them. 
36
 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) are another way to achieve legal certainty, however discussion on such 
treaties is beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader can for instance refer to Neumayer and Spess 
(2005) or Sauvant (2009). 
37
 See Jirousek (2013b), pp. 478ff.  “This principle of dynamic interpretation is explicitly stated in many of the 
Austrian protocols, although it could also be applied in the absence of specific treaty provisions on the basis of 
interpretation rules of Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and in the context of para. 35 of 
the Model Commentary in the Introduction of the OECD MC”.  Lang criticises this dynamic interpretation, 
because later versions of the OECD commentary which were not available at the time when a given DTT was 
negotiated should not be legally binding to DTT provisions, see also Lang and Brugger (2008), pp. 107-108.  
38
 See Pistone (2012), p. 6. 
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the aim to reduce its tax liability.39 To prevent international tax avoidance, some countries 
prefer to include anti-avoidance provisions, such as subject-to-tax clauses,40 in their DTTs. 
Austria, however, prefers to apply anti-avoidance provisions in its domestic law, and not in its 
DTTs. Austria´s argument is that specific anti-avoidance provisions in DTTs may stimulate 
creative tax planners to find ways to circumvent them and, therefore, it would be difficult for 
tax authorities to argue that there are possible abusive applications of DTTs.41  
The exchange of information provisions in DTTs have proven to be useful tools to 
prevent not only tax avoidance, but also tax evasion, which – in contrast to tax avoidance – is 
an illegal way of avoiding paying taxes. All Austrian DTTs (except for the one with 
Luxembourg) provide for the exchange of information concerning tax matters. For a long 
time, Austria has had major information exchange clauses only with OECD countries. The 
major clause, in line with OECD standards, obliges signatory countries to exchange relevant 
information for the application of both DTT provisions and enforcement of domestic laws 
regarding taxes of every kind (income tax, valued added taxes, etc.).42 In its DTTs with non-
OECD countries, especially developing countries, Austria had only offered minor exchange 
clauses. A minor clause only allows exchanging information relevant for the application of 
DTT provisions (i.e. it does not cover exchange of information for enforcement of domestic 
laws or related to other taxes other than those covered by DTTs, i.e. income tax). 
The official reason given to offer only minor exchange of information clause to non-
OECD countries was that there is no certainty as to whether those countries would be able to 
secure privacy of exchanged data.43 However, according to Lang (2012), another reason might 
be that offering “too much” administrative assistance, i.e., too much information to other tax 
authorities, may constitute a “competitive disadvantage” for Austria.44  
Austria is known internationally for its strict bank secrecy rules, which undoubtedly 
impede on the exchange of information in connection with bank accounts of foreign residents 
held with Austrian banks. Generally speaking, as most tax systems around the world are based 
on the residence principle, i.e. taxation of their residents‟ worldwide income, the exchange of, 
for instance, financial information (e.g. bank accounts in a given country held by tax residents 
                                                     
39
 IBFD Tax Research Platform, Glossary, tax avoidance. 
40
 A subject-to-tax clause applies if a source country is allocated taxation rights but it does not exercise its 
taxation right (e.g. because the income is tax-exempt under domestic law). In such a situation, a subject-to-tax 
clause allows a residence country to override the DTT and tax the income under its own domestic law. 
41
 See Loukota, Seitz, Toifl, (2004), p. 368. 
42
 See Lang (2013), p. 157. 
43
 See Loukota, Seitz, Toifl, (2004), p. 369. 
44 For the fear that illegal earnings might be reported, there is anecdotal evidence of major orders that were 
shifted from countries with a major information clause to other countries that do not have such a major 
information clause  (see Lang, 2012, p. 109). 
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of other countries) is imperative for a country to effectively enforce taxation of income from 
foreign sources.45 Without such a network of exchanging information, it is harder for tax 
authorities, to detect cases where its tax residents do not report all income derived from 
foreign sources. Therefore, a mechanism for the exchange of information, which may also be 
an effective instrument to frighten potential tax evaders,46 would be crucial for both developed 
and developing countries to ensure they collect their tax revenues. 
 In 2005 the OECD introduced a new standard of information exchange in Article 26 
of its DTT Model.47 Still wanting to preserve its bank secrecy laws, Austria made a 
reservation and refused to implement this standard. Yet, due to international pressure of the 
G20, the OECD and the EU, in March 2009, Austria had to withdraw its objection to Article 
26 of the OECD Model and started to endorse the OECD standards regarding transparency 
and administrative assistance in tax matters.48 Since then, Austria has been, to some extent, 
adapting its DTT network. In the more recently negotiated DTTs and the renegotiations of 
existing DTTs, Austria is slowly implementing, to some extent, information exchange 
following OECD standards.49 Although adjustments have been made in Austria, such as 
applying its strict bank secrecy rules only to domestic situations, the exchange of information 
with non-OECD countries occurs via the “on request” basis. This forces the requesting 
country to provide enough information to clearly identify the person under examination, 
limiting the power of this provision to only limited and specific cases.50 
Tax authorities can exchange information in different forms. The OECD Model puts 
forward three types of information exchange: (i) exchange upon request (a request for 
information is made having in mind a specific case of potential avoidance/evasion), (ii) 
automatic exchange (a country systematically exchanges all information it has regarding 
business transactions of residents of another country gaining income within its territory) and 
(iii) spontaneous exchange of information (a country exchanges information without any 
request but it assumes the information may be of interest to the other country).51 It is 
important to note that the OECD favours the automatic exchange of information, as it recently 
released a report on a standard for automatic exchange of financial account information in tax 
                                                     
45
 See McGauran (2013), p. 15. 
46
 See Alliance Sud (2005), p. 14. 
47
 OECD Model (2010) Article 26 (4) and (5). 
48
 At the same time, also Belgium, Switzerland, and Luxembourg accepted to change their policies in this regard 
and to endorse the OECD standards (Jirousek, 2014, p. 27). 
49
 To date, more than 20 DTTs have already been revised (Jirousek, 2014, p. 29).  
50
 Jirousek (2013b), p. 467.  
51
 OECD Model (2010), Commentary on Article 26, Paragraph 9 and 9.1. 
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matters.52 However, it is often the case that an automatic exchange of information is only 
available where DTTs between OECD countries are signed, but not in asymmetric DTTs 
agreed on between developed and developing countries.  
Tax Information Exchange Agreements, or TIEAs, which are another bilateral tax 
agreement facilitating the exchange of information concerning tax affairs of individuals and 
companies alike.53 TIEAs are concluded with a view to address tax avoidance and evasion. 
However, unlike DTTs, TIEAs do not include provisions concerning the allocation of taxation 
rights and avoidance of double taxation. In this regard, Austria prefers to negotiate DTTs with 
an exchange of information clause rather than negotiate TIEAs. To date Austria has only six 
TIEAs, none of them with developing countries.54  
In the field of administrative cooperation for the recovery of tax claims, Austria has 
been slower to adapt international standards. Article 27 of the OECD Model, which allows 
signatory countries to assist each other in executing tax revenue claims, is included in 
Austrian DTTs only when requested by a signee country55 and when Austria assumes that the 
partner country respects laws concerning confidentiality and the use of such information 
exclusively for tax matters.56 Therefore, similar to the exchange of information issue, Austria 
prefers to include this provision in DTTs exclusively with OECD-countries and not with 
developing countries. 
There is a global tendency to shift from bilateral to multilateral agreements. The 
OECD together with the Council of Europe and the strong political support of the G2057 
designed the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters 
(Mutual Assistance Convention). This Convention has served to push many countries to 
comply with the OECD standards, as otherwise they risk to be exposed as non-compliant 
                                                     
52
 On July 21, 2014 the OECD issued its standard for automatic exchange of financial account information in tax 
matters, available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/standard-for-automatic-
exchange-of-financial-account-information-for-tax-matters_9789264216525-en#page1 
53 The origin of TIEAs dates back to 2002, when the OECD issued its “Model Agreement on Exchange of 
Information” 53 that served as a starting point for bilateral negotiations of this nature. Since then it has been 
adopted as an internationally accepted standard.  
54 Austrian has concluded TIEAs with 6 countries. These are Andorra, Gibraltar, Jersey, Monaco, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines and Guernsey (which is still not in force). Further, Austria is negotiating TIEAs with 
Uruguay and Cayman Islands.  
55
 For instance, the DTTs with Mexico and Turkey contain such provisions (Lang, 2012, p. 128). 
56
 See Lang (2012). 
57
 Since 2009 the G20 has encouraged countries to sign the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters including most recently at the meeting of the G20 Leaders Summit in September 2013 
where the Communiqué stated “We call on all countries to join the Multilateral Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in tax Matters without further delay.” See www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax 
information/conventiononmutualadministrativeassistanceintaxmatters.htm. 
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countries before the international community.58 Such a transition to multilateral agreements 
could be beneficial for developing countries, if an important goal is to obtain legal means for 
exchanging information to counteract tax evasion and avoidance.  
The Mutual Assistance Convention serves as a legal instrument to address tax 
avoidance and evasion without a need to sign a bilateral tax agreement like a DTT or a TIEA. 
This multilateral agreement is broader than a TIEA, as it provides additional tools to facilitate 
cooperation between tax administrations. This includes the exchange of information on 
request, on a spontaneous and an automatic basis, joint tax audits between tax authorities of 
signatory countries, assistance in recovery of taxes and the servicing of documents. As of 
August 2014 there were over 67 signatories of the Convention, including all G-20 countries, 
all BRIC countries, almost all OECD and EU countries and an increasing number of 
developing countries.
 59
 Austria signed the Mutual Assistance Convention on the 29
th
 May, 
2013, it ratified it on 28
th
 August, 2014 and will enter into force on the 1
st
 December, 2014. 
 
2.3 The Allocation of Taxation Rights in Austria’s DTTs and the Effects on 
Developing Countries  
In each of its DTTs, Austria tries to deviate as little as possible from the OECD 
Model. This extends from the way Austria interprets to how it applies its DTT provisions. As 
mentioned in Section 2.2, the regularly updated OECD Commentaries are legally binding in 
some Austrian DTTs.60 Austria‟s view is that a DTT in line with the OECD Model becomes a 
valuable and attractive instrument for promoting business and bilateral relations.61  
However, for a developing country (typically a source country), such an agreement 
would mean shifting some of its taxation rights (acquired by means of its domestic tax 
legislation) to Austria, as DTTs favour residence-based taxation. From a source country‟s 
perspective this may well be justified if a DTT attracts new investment; and thus the loss in 
tax revenues may be offset.  
With regards to the DTT business profits provision, which is one of the most relevant 
rules allocating taxation rights in DTTs (Article 7 of the OECD Model), Austria tries to 
implement the OECD Model in its entirety. This provision stipulates that when a company 
                                                     
58
 See Pistone (2014). The US is also pushing for a multilateral and automatic exchange of information through 
the implementation of the US FATCA regime (see Lang and Owens, 2013, p. 3).  
59
 The list of signatory countries can be found at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-
information/Status_of_convention.pdf (Access on 1st September, 2014). 
60
 See, for example, DTT Austria-Cuba, point 7 of the Protocol; see also DTT Austria-Mexico, point 1 of the 
Protocol. 
61
 Loukota, Seitz, Toifl (2004), p. 368. 
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resident in Austria generates business profits in another DTT partner country, the profits are 
only taxable in Austria. However, in the case where there is a PE (i.e. a substantial business 
presence through a fix place of business or a dependent agent) in the other DTT country, the 
other country has the right to tax the profits attributable to that PE. As will be explained in 
more detail in Section 2.3.1, Austria seeks to impose the OECD Model with regards to both 
the definition of a PE and the method to compute how much profit is attributable to a PE.62   
With regards to other tax allocation rules, Austria‟s DTT policy includes two main 
deviations from the OECD Model. These deviations concern taxes on dividends and interest. 
Here, Austria aims to reduce source taxation even beyond internationally accepted standards 
(see Sections 2.3.2). Such deviations are in line with Austria‟s domestic tax law and its goal to 
promote itself as an attractive business location. 
 
2.3.1 Business Profits 
The definition of a PE and the method of computing business profits attributable to the 
PE are crucial. Unlike the OECD Model, domestic laws, especially those of developing 
countries, often provide for a wider definition of what a PE is as well as a broader approach to 
allocate profits to a PE. Thus, Austria‟s position to fully adopt the principles of the OECD 
Model in its DTTs can lead to a situation where certain activities, which may be regarded as a 
PE under the domestic law of the source country, are not regarded as a PE according to the 
definition in the DTT. As a result, the source country, where the PE is located, is granted less 
or no taxation rights. 
Further, a delicate issue of DTTs with developing countries is the so-called “Service 
PE” provision, which Austria tends not to include in its DTTs, as it is not part of the OECD 
Model. Such clause provides that a company is deemed to own a PE in a source country if a 
foreign company renders services through employees and/or other personnel in the source 
country. This may include, for instance, management fees paid by a subsidiary located in 
another country to headquarters located in Austria, and may apply to SPEs located in Austria 
that manage subsidiaries belonging to the same business group. In the absence of this Service 
PE provision in Austrian DTTs, services rendered by Austrian SPEs would technically not 
constitute a PE in other countries. This may open the possibility of shifting taxable profits like 
management fees from a company located in a developing country to Austria; as management 
services would not create a PE, they would be treated as business profits to be exclusively 
taxed in the residence country (i.e. Austria). 
                                                     
62
 The definitions and the method to compute the profits attributable to the PE differ in the UN and the OECD 
Model. 
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2.3.2 Passive Income 
 
Royalties 
Austria follows the OECD Model and insists in DTT negotiations to exempt royalties 
from taxation at the source country.63 As mentioned in section 2.2, withholding tax rates on 
passive income - including royalties - are usually higher under domestic law than under 
DTTs.  
In cases where Austria negotiates a DTT that grants taxation rights over royalty 
income to a source country, Austria strives to keep the definition of royalties as close as 
possible to the definition provided in the OECD Model. The practical implication of this 
policy is that if a DTT allows for the taxation of royalties in a source country, the narrow 
definition of the term “royalties”, which often is narrower than the definition provided under 
domestic laws of developing countries, implies that some payments do not qualify as royalties 
but rather as business profits. In this case, the DTT provision regarding business profits 
patterned after the OECD Model stipulates exclusive taxation rights for the residence country 
(i.e. Austria).  
 
Dividends 
Austria‟s domestic tax law includes the so-called “international participation 
exemption law”, according to which foreign source dividends received by Austrian companies 
are exempt from taxation.64 This legislation is derived from the EU Parent Subsidiary 
Directive, which standardizes tax exemption for internal company dividends within the EU. 
However, even beyond the intended scope of the EU Directive, Austrian DTTs extends the 
participation exemption regime to include non-EU countries.  
Austria‟s DTT policy favors the removing of taxation on the cross-border distribution 
of dividends. The reason to exempt intercompany dividends is to avoid economic double 
taxation. This means that, in practice, taxation is imposed only once in a money trail. Taxation 
occurs only when a company generates profits, and not a second time on shareholders, where 
dividends are distributed. To achieve this, Austria keeps source taxation on dividends as low 
as possible; in some cases taxation reaches zero. The scope of the EU participation exemption 
                                                     
63
 Loukota, Seitz, Toifl (2004), p. 368; see also table 3, for the withholding tax rates on royalties with developing 
countries in Austrian DTTs. 
64
 See IBFD Research Platform, Country Analyses, Austria, Corporate Taxation, International Aspects, p.57.  
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requirement is also extended to a minimum shareholder participation of 10% as stipulated in 
Austrian DTTs.65  
In contrast to Austria‟s DTT policy, the OECD Model advocates a 5% withholding tax 
rate at the source for direct investments where a shareholder holds at least 25% of the capital 
of the company paying dividends,66 and a 15% withholding tax rate for portfolio investment 
where a shareholder holds less than 25% of the capital of the company paying dividends.67 
From Austria‟s perspective, this deviation from the OECD Model is seen as a strategy to 
create an attractive legal environment in order to promote itself as an attractive business 
location. This is especially targeted at foreign companies that are willing to use Austria as a 
routing investment vehicle for investment in third countries.  
 
Interest 
Interest payments to non-residents are, generally speaking, not subject to taxation 
under Austrian tax law.68 Similar to dividend taxation, Austria negotiates in its DTTs to 
reduce source taxation on interest to as low as possible (in some cases taxation can reach zero 
per cent).69 Austria‟s argument for zero source taxation of interest payments is that as Austria 
does not tax interest payments made to non-residents, source taxation provided under DTTs 
would only benefit the other signatory country. Thus, Austria‟s argument is that there would 
be a unilateral revenue loss for Austria.70  
 However, if zero per cent taxation is not achieved, Austria accepts source taxation 
only when it is ensured that its DTT country partner does not grant third countries – especially 
neighboring countries – lower withholding tax rates.71 This is usually negotiated in a “most 
favored nation clause” provision, stating that if a DTT country partner agrees on a lower 
withholding rate for passive income, or on exemption, in a DTT with any other country, this 
lower tax rate, or exemption, will automatically apply to the DTT with Austria.  
                                                     
65
 Loukota, Seitz, Toifl (2004), p.367. 
66
 OECD Model (2010) Article 10 (2) a). 
67
 OECD Model (2010) Article 10 (2) b). 
68
 See IBFD Research Platform, Country Analyses, Austria, Corporate Taxation, International Aspects, p.65; 
IBFD Research Platform, News, Austria, Ministry of Finance issues draft version of the Tax Law Amendment 
Act 2014 on January 17, 2014. 
69
 Loukota, Seitz, Toifl (2004), p. 367.  
70
 Loukota, Seitz, Toifl (2004), p.367 
71
 “Most favoured nation clauses have the effect of requiring one of the contracting states to grant similar tax 
benefits to residents of the other contracting state to the extent it grants such benefits (e.g. by way of a bilateral 
tax treaty) to residents of other countries and those benefits are more favourable (lower taxation at source) than 
those in the tax treaty between the two contracting states” Jirousek (2013a); see IBFD Tax Research Platform, 
Glossary, most favoured nation clause; see also Hofbauer (2005), pp. 445-453 and  Loukota, Seitz, Toifl (2004), 
p. 367. 
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If a source country potentially grants lower interest taxation in a DTT with another 
country, from Austria‟s perspective there would be a potential risk of treaty shopping for 
Austrian and other foreign companies working under their jurisdiction. These firms may be 
able to use the DTTs with other countries to reroute FDI to developing countries, thus 
harming Austria‟s intent to establish itself as a business location for routing investment in 
developing countries. However, most “favored nation clauses” increase the complexity of 
DTTs, especially for developing countries and their increasing DTT networks, creating a 
significant advantage for Austria as a competitive location for routing investment to third 
countries. 
2.4 Summary 
Austria‟s international tax strategy has four main goals at its core, to: (i) prevent 
double taxation, (ii) foster bilateral economic relations, (iii) increase legal certainty, and (iv) 
prevent international tax avoidance and tax evasion. As regards to double taxation, this is 
already dealt with in a similar way under Austria‟s domestic law. 
In Austria‟s view, the signing of DTTs fosters bilateral economic relations and 
increases legal certainty. Austria uses its own DTT Model, which is very similar to the OECD 
Model as a starting point for its DTT negotiations and includes provisions binding the latest 
version of the OECD Commentaries as a legal means for interpreting DTT provisions. The 
practical effect of these outcomes is to ensure reduced source taxation. 
With regard to preventing tax avoidance, Austria prefers not to include specific anti-
avoidance provision in its DTTs, but addresses this issue by applying anti-avoidance measures 
under its domestic tax laws. Therefore, it is arguable whether the signing of DTTs actually 
helps in preventing tax avoidance.  
According to the OECD, the effective tools to fight international tax avoidance and 
evasion are the exchange of information and administrative cooperation between tax 
jurisdictions. In this respect, Austria‟s policy deviates from the OECD standards. While 
Austria has major exchange information clauses in DTTs with OECD countries, non-OECD 
countries are offered minor exchange information clauses. Further, Austria only offers 
exchange of information “on request” basis with non-OECD countries. However, there is the 
problem with information provided on request, as it is often difficult and cumbersome to 
access the required data. In addition, TIEAs, which are also an option to exchange 
information rather than negotiating a DTT, also deal with the exchange of information in tax 
matters. If countries wish to further benefit from assistance in tax matters, there is also the 
  
15 
 
Mutual Assistance Convention, which Austria recently ratified (see section 2.2). The Mutual 
Assistance Convention has the advantage of multilateralism, where predetermined rules set a 
consistent legal framework for all signatory countries to be implemented. In this respect, a 
country should thus be aware that it has several tools to achieve exchange of information and 
assistance in tax matters, and should weigh out which one suits its needs best. 
To sum up, it could be conjectured that in its DTTs, Austria: (i) disproportionally allocates 
taxation rights to the residence country (which typically, in relation with developing 
countries, is Austria) thus inducing a loss in revenue for developing countries, and (ii) limits a 
developing country‟s access to satisfactory equal exchanges of information according to 
OECD standards. Therefore, developing countries that sign a DTT with Austria can only hope 
that revenue sacrificed is offset with the attraction of new FDI that a DTT may bring. In the 
analysis to follow, we investigate from an economic perspective whether Austrian DTTs with 
developing countries actually trigger an increase in FDI in developing countries.  
 
3. Economic Analysis of the Effects of DTTs on Austrian OFDI in 
Developing Countries 
3.1 Austria’s FDI Position 
The Austrian economy is a “latecomer in FDI”.72  Until the mid-1990s, both outward 
and inward FDI stocks per GDP were below average when compared with other European 
countries.73 During this time, Austrian firms largely confined their international activity to 
trade, and rarely ventured into international investment projects. In 1994, outward FDI stocks 
amounted to 7,671 million Euros, which corresponded to 5% of Austrian GDP.74 Inward FDI 
stocks, which accounted for 7% of Austrian GDP, slightly surpassed the outward stocks.75 
Since 1995, the year of Austria‟s accession to the EU, Austrian outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI) has soared (see Figure 1). The opening up of the Eastern European 
markets has accelerated the growth of Austrian OFDI to such a degree that Austria was 
among the 20 largest foreign investors globally in 2008.76  
Traditionally being a capital-importer, Austria‟s investment position started to reverse 
in 2002, and the country became a net capital-exporter.77 Since 2010, also Austria‟s OFDI 
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 Bellak (2001), p. 108.  
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 For a detailed analysis of the patterns of Austrian FDI see Bellak (2001).  
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 BMWFJ (2012a).  
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 BMWFJ, Österreichs Außenwirtschaft (2012a), p. 10.  
76
 Bellak and Mayer (2010). 
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stocks have been exceeding its inward FDI stocks. Albeit outgoing investments flows 
decreased considerably in the course of the current economic crisis,78 OFDI stocks reached 
167.3 billion Euros and accounted for about 51.9% of the Austrian GDP in 2013. Inward FDI 
stocks, on the other hand, accounted for 136.5 billion Euros, corresponding to 42.3% of GDP 
in 2013.79 
Figure 1: Total amount of Austrian OFDI stocks in million Euros, 1989-2011 
 
 
Data source: OeNB Statistische Sonderauswertung. Own illustration. 
 
Austria has also positioned itself as an attractive hub for businesses (see also Section 
2.1). A number of foreign companies have established affiliates in Austria, used to invest in 
third countries, especially in Central Eastern European Countries (CEEC). Of the Austrian 
OFDI in developing countries, about one third, both in terms of FDI projects and in terms of 
total capital invested, is attributed to foreign companies that invest in the respective 
developing countries via an Austrian subsidiary.  
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3.2 Geographical distribution of Austrian OFDI 
Globally, FDI flows to developing countries have increased significantly in the last 
decade. In 2012, for the first time ever, developing countries attracted more FDI inflows than 
developed countries (52%).80 Following this trend, Austrian FDI to developing countries has 
gained in importance since the year 2000 and, in 2011, 15.6% of all Austrian OFDI projects 
were located in developing countries.81  
Austrian OFDI in developing countries is primarily focused in Europe and Asia. In 
2011, about 45% of all Austrian OFDI that flowed to developing countries was allocated in 
Europe (see Table 1). 37% of the Austrian OFDI projects were located in Asia (esp. China, 
Turkey and India), 12.4% in Latin America (esp. Brazil and Mexico), and 4.4% in Africa 
(mainly South Africa).  
On the country level, in 2011, Austrian firms were active in 50 of the 143 countries 
that receive official development assistance (ODA-recipient countries). Nevertheless, 
Austrian FDI activity in developing countries is quite concentrated. Ninety percent of all 
Austrian OFDI was invested in only 17 ODA-recipient countries. In 2011, the most important 
investment locations for Austrian firms among developing countries were Serbia, China, 
Ukraine, and Turkey (see Table 1).  
  
                                                     
80
 UNCTAD, (2013), p. xii.  
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 Data source: OeNB Statistische Sonderauswertung. 
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Table 1: Geographical Distribution of Austrian FDI Projects in 2011 
 
Data source: OeNB, Statistische Sonderauswertung, own calculations. 
 
  
Region/Country Number of 
projects 
in percentages Country Rank 
 
Developing countries total  795 100%  
Europe 364 45.79%  
Serbia 126 15.85% 1 
Ukraine 95 11.95% 3 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 60 7.55% 5 
Macedonia 28 3.52% 8 
Albania 20 2.52% 9 
Montenegro 19 2.39% 10 
Belarus 11 1.38% 15 
Asia 295 37.11%  
China  115 14.47% 2 
Turkey  69 8.68% 4 
India 39 4.91% 7 
Thailand 15 1.89% 13 
Malaysia 14 1.76% 14 
Kazakhstan 9 1.13% 16 
Africa 35 4.40%  
South Africa  18 2.23% 11 
Tunisia 5 0.63% 17 
Algeria  5 0.63% 17 
Latin America 101 12.70%  
Brazil  47 5.91% 6 
Mexico 16 2.01% 12 
Chile 9 1.13% 16 
Colombia 9 1.13% 16 
Argentina 9 1.13% 16 
Grenada 5 0.63% 17 
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3.3 DTTs and Inward FDI in Developing Countries 
For developing countries, attracting FDI inflows is a main (though not the only) 
motivation to sign DTTs. Many of the other expected benefits, such as the exchange of 
information, or the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion are hard to quantify with concrete 
evidence. Although developing countries (typically in the position of a capital-importer and 
thus of a source country) may forego tax revenues when signing a DTT based on the OECD 
Model, the rationale behind this is to attract enough direct investment to offset immediate tax 
revenue losses. Additionally, Braun and Zagler (forthcoming) provide evidence that OECD 
countries may compensate developing countries for their loss of tax revenues due to a DTT 
through official development assistance. They find that an OECD and a developing country 
are more likely to sign a DTT the more official development assistance the developing 
country receives from the OECD country.  
Further, evidence shows that a country‟s decision as of whether or not to sign a DTT 
may also be influenced by other countries‟ double tax treaty policies. Baistrocchi (2008) 
argues that “capital-importing countries are prompted to seek DTTs for fear of driving FDI 
away to competing countries if these other countries, with which the country competes for 
scarce foreign capital, have already signed DTTs”82Similarly, Barthel and Neumayer (2012) 
provide empirical evidence that capital-importing countries find themselves in a classical 
prisoners‟ dilemma when it comes to signing DTTs. Given asymmetric investment positions 
which may lead to reduced tax revenues in the capital-importing countries, these countries 
would collectively be better off cooperating with each other, that means, they would 
collectively be better off if they refused to sign DTTs with capital-exporting countries. 
However, as a DTT may make a country more attractive for international investments, every 
developing country individually benefits from signing DTTs in the sense that it secures the 
country a competitive advantage compared to other developing countries; or at least it 
prevents a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis those countries that have already signed a DTT. 
This geographical interdependence may help to explain why developing countries are willing 
to sign DTTs even though they may not benefit from it as much as the capital-exporting 
counterparty. 
Evidently, taxation is only one of many factors determining the location choice of 
international firms. Yet, it is undoubtedly an important tool policy makers have at their 
disposal. We thus focus in this section on one question, namely, whether or not DTTs trigger 
a boost of FDI in developing countries.  
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The influx of FDI is often viewed as highly attractive to many countries, as FDI 
inflows can spur economic growth.
83
 FDI may boost capital accumulation, create job 
opportunities, increase the integration into the international economy, and contribute to the 
formalization of the host economy by extending value chains. As a result, also tax revenues 
may rise.84 Moreover, affiliates of MNEs can enhance human capital in a host country and 
generate technological spillovers to local businesses, such as knowhow regarding new 
production techniques. This may increase productivity of local firms.85 FDI can thus be an 
integral part of a country‟s strategy to foster economic development.86 The theoretical basis 
for such positive effects is mainly provided by the “capital fundamentalism” approach, as well 
as the neoclassical and the endogenous growth theories.87  
On the other hand, FDI inflows can also trigger considerable downsides. FDI may 
create economic enclaves that are not connected with the local economy, crowd out domestic 
investment, and/or curtail economic instability. Investments of foreign companies could 
contribute to environmental pollution and deterioration. MNEs may also be able to 
circumvent national regulations like those regarding labour laws.88 The dependence theory 
moreover emphasizes that FDI influx may contribute to perpetuating the economic and 
political dependence of developing countries (“the periphery”) on developed countries (“the 
centre”). As long as foreign affiliates located in the periphery are constrained to supplying 
developed countries with natural resources and inexpensive labour, while decision making 
functions remain in the headquarters in developed countries, the presence of MNEs in the 
periphery contributes to sustaining political and economic dependence. Additionally, by 
opening up markets in the periphery, MNEs from the centre are able to preserve and 
strengthen their dominating role in the international stage.89 
To what degree potential benefits of FDI materialize largely depends on local political 
or institutional factors, as well as on the absorptive capacities of a host economy.90 When a 
host country has a certain level of technological knowhow, of human capital stock, and when 
the infrastructure, including financial markets, are developed to a certain degree91, it is more 
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likely to reap the benefits from FDI inflows.92 Generally, middle-income countries are thus 
found to benefit more from FDI than low-income countries.93  
Clearly, a range of political and economic factors determines a country‟s attractiveness 
for FDI. Amongst others, geographical location, political stability, infrastructure, the size of 
the host market, labour cost, quality of the host country‟s institutions, and red tape of potential 
host countries all play a role in a MNE‟s decision where to set up a foreign affiliate.94 
Business surveys and econometric analyses also show that in addition to these determinants, 
tax factors – including the presence of double tax treaties – impact the location choice of 
MNEs.95 From a policy perspective, DTTs are very appealing as an instrument to attract 
investment, as they can be implemented rather quickly in comparison to changing other 
factors such as the skill level of workers, which, for example, take a long time to show 
positive results. 
3.4 Previous Economic Literature on the Effects of DTTs on FDI Activity 
A priori, it is not clear whether and how DTTs impact FDI activity. On the one hand, 
DTTs may have a positive effect on FDI. Developing countries entering into these agreements 
signal to the international community a spirit of openness and willingness to adopt 
internationally accepted tax standards. In addition, also the reduction of withholding tax rates 
on passive income and the relief from double taxation provided for in DTTs may encourage 
FDI.  
On the other hand, DTTs may hamper FDI, as they also may allow the exchange of 
information between the tax authorities (also see Section 2.2). Furthermore, studies show that 
a comprehensive domestic legislation that provides an overall transparent, non-discriminatory 
and predictable tax environment may be more important for foreign investors than a DTT 
alone.96 In fact, a clear relationship between domestic law and DTTs is important for an easier 
application of DTT provisions. This concerns (i) terms that are not explicitly defined in DTTs, 
(ii) procedures to apply the DTT provisions, such as mechanisms to withhold taxes on passive 
income and methods to avoid double taxation, as well as (iii) procedures to exchange tax 
information, among others.97  
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Hence, it is an empirical question as of whether or not DTTs help to attract FDI. The 
economic literature investigating in how far DTTs have an impact on FDI has produced 
mixed results. Some authors find that DTTs promote higher FDI activity.98 Other studies find 
no or negative effects of DTTs on FDI.99 While some authors like Baker (2012) argue that 
DTTs simply do not impact FDI decisions, others like Coupé et al. (2009) or Blonigen et al. 
(2014) attribute inconclusive findings to the conflicting single provisions in the DTTs. 
Blonigen, Oldensky and Sly (2014) try to disentangle the opposing effects of DTTs 
and find indirect evidence for these countervailing effects, i.e. a negative effect of the 
exchange of information and a positive effect of lower withholding tax rates. Using micro-
data on foreign subsidiaries of U.S. MNEs, the authors conclude that it depends on the 
specific type of firm affected by the DTT which of these effects prevails.   
Regarding the extant literature, we would like to emphasize two issues. The first 
relates to the type of investment decision that is analysed, and the second to the sample of 
host countries that such analyses cover.  
First, a firm‟s international location choice consists of two separate decisions. One, a 
firm decides as to whether or not to invest in a specific country, the so-called “extensive 
margin”. Once this decision is made, a firm chooses how much capital to invest in a foreign 
affiliate, i.e. the firm decides on the “intensive margin of investment”. Davies et al. (2010) 
and Egger and Merlo (2011) are, to our knowledge, the only studies explicitly analysing this 
decision at the so-called “extensive margin”. Using Swedish and German firm-level data 
respectively, both studies find that when a DTT is in place between two countries, there is a 
positive effect on the likelihood of a firm to establish an affiliate in a given host country. Both 
studies argue that this positive effect may be explained by the tax certainty that DTTs signal. 
Second, the samples of most existing studies include both developed and developing 
countries as potential host countries. Yet Blonigen and Wang (2005) claim that investment 
location decisions in developed and developing countries are likely to be determined by very 
different factors. Thus, the grouping of both types of countries in empirical analysis is 
considered to be problematic. In our analysis we only include developing countries as 
potential host countries.  
Existing studies focusing on non-OECD countries as host countries do not produce 
clear-cut findings. On the one hand, Coupé et al. (2009) fail to find a consistent impact 
stemming from DTTs on FDI in transition economies, and Baker (2012) concludes that DTTs 
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do not impact FDI location decisions in developing countries. On the other hand, Neumayer 
(2007) finds positive effects of DTTs on FDI in middle-income countries (but not in low 
income countries), and Barthel et al. (2010) find that DTTs encourage FDI in both middle- 
and low-income countries.  
3.5 Method 
3.5.1 Sample 
Austrian FDI activity in developing countries has increased significantly since 1990 
(see Section 3.1) and also the number of DTTs that Austria has signed with developing 
countries has risen (see Figure 2).100 As of December 2013, 36 Austrian DTTs with 
developing countries are in place.101 
Figure 2: Austrian FDI and DTTs with Developing Countries, 1989-2011 
 
 
Data sources: OeNB Statistische Sonderauswertung, Bundesministerium für Finanzen (2014). Own illustration. 
  
For the following analysis of Austrian FDI projects in developing countries, the 
Austrian National Bank has kindly provided the FDI data on special request. We have 
constructed a panel data set that covers 104 potential host countries over the period from 1990 
to 2011.102  
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3.5.2 Dependent Variable 
As DTTs may impact international investment at both the extensive and the intensive 
margin, we study both effects. First, it is examined whether the existence of a DTT makes it 
more likely that an Austrian firm invests in a given host country. This effect of DTTs at the 
extensive margin of investments is analysed in a logistic regression model. As dependent 
variable, we use a dummy variable that takes the values one or zero, indicating whether or not 
Austrian FDI exists in a specific host country.  
Second, we analyse whether having a DTT with Austria leads to an increase in the 
number of Austrian FDI projects in a developing country. This can be interpreted as the 
intensive margin.103 The number of FDI projects in a given country in a given year is the 
dependent variable, and count data models are used.104 
 
3.5.3 Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variable of main interest is a dummy variable indicating whether or 
not Austria has a DTT in place with a specific partner country. The economic literature gives 
several methods in which to measure this: some studies use the date when a DTT is signed; 
others use the date when a treaty becomes effective. We use the latter, as this is the date that is 
most relevant for international investors.105 As a robustness test, we also run regressions with 
the date of signature, which leads to the same result. 
Depending on how the value chain of a company is split geographically, the literature 
distinguishes between two types of FDI: horizontal and vertical FDI.
106
 When a company 
transfers activities abroad, which are in the “same (horizontal) stage of the production 
process”107, this is known as horizontal FDI. Vertical FDI, on the other hand, refers to the 
international division of activities along the value chain.
108
   
Horizontal FDI is assumed to be more likely in more alike countries. This idea is 
incorporated in our empirical framework through the similarity index, which indicates how 
similar a potential host country is to Austria in terms of GDP per capita (similarity). 
                                                     
103
 This analysis is a bit of a hybrid, as it can arguably also be interpreted as an extensive-margin decision (see 
Egger and Merlo, 2011, p. 149). 
104
 Due to confidentiality reasons, the amount in EUR of the individual investments is not available for research. 
Thus, regressions using the actual size of the investment in Euros are not possible. 
105
 Also see Barthel et al., 2010, p. 372. 
106
 See e.g. Navaretti and Venables (2004), pp. 24ff. 
107
 Ibid at p. 25. 
108
 Ibid at p. 27. 
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Alternatively, the GDP per capita (gdppc) is also used.109 Trade costs, captured by variables 
such as distance or the trade barriers between two countries, are also seen as a major 
determinants of FDI. As our regressions include country fixed effects that account for factors 
that do not vary over time, the geographical distance between Austria and respective host 
countries is not included. Rather, we use the general openness of a country to trade, defined as 
total exports plus imports divided by GDP, as a control variable to represent the general 
openness of a country (openness). It is expected that a country that is generally more open to 
international economic activity also attracts more FDI. 
As we are interested in the effects of international tax policy in general, and DTTs in 
particular, a measure of the corporate income tax rate is included in our analysis. Ideally, 
statutory and/or effective corporate tax rates of a host country as well as withholding tax rates 
on dividends, interest, and royalties that are paid to Austria would be included in our analysis. 
All these tax rates potentially play a role in a firm‟s location decision; however, for a large 
number of developing countries withholding tax rates are not readily available and are very 
difficult to compile. With this being considered, withholding tax rates have not been included 
in our empirical analysis. As corporate tax rates for many developing countries are also not 
available, we follow the lead of Egger et al. (2006) and Baker (2012), using general 
government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP as a proxy for the 
corporate tax rate.
110
 A higher tax rate is expected to make a country less attractive for foreign 
investors.111 
As a further control variable, we incorporate the corruption index, made available by 
the Heritage Foundation (corruption). Empirical studies bring about mixed evidence as to 
                                                     
109
 We also ran regressions that focus on dissimilarities between countries which drive vertical FDI. We used the 
percentage of persons that are enrolled in secondary schooling in a potential host country and compared this ratio 
to the Austrian enrolment ratio in secondary schooling (data from the World Development Indicators of the 
World Bank). We tested whether a higher difference in secondary enrolment ratios encourages or discourages 
Austrian FDI in a potential host country. The dissimilarity variable has a negative effect on FDI in the logit 
regressions, indicating that countries that are more similar to Austria in terms of secondary schooling are more 
likely to receive Austrian FDI. The count data regressions, on the other hand, suggest that countries that are more 
dissimilar to Austria receive a larger number of Austrian FDI projects. Also in these regressions, the DTT 
variable has a positive and significant effect on Austrian FDI activity. 
110
 The regressions were also run using the statutory corporate tax rate of the host countries. For many 
specifications, the results remain unchanged, however the DTT-variable is not persistently significant. This is 
probably due to the smaller sample of countries, which excludes notably the CIS-countries, which still are 
important FDI locations for Austria firms, and most African countries. In this smaller sample of countries, the 
proxy used and the statutory corporate income tax rate exhibit very similar results. Results are not presented here 
but are available on request; tax data from Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010) and Braun and Weichenrieder 
(forthcoming). 
111
 For a recent overview of the empirical evidence of the effect of taxation on FDI see Feld and Heckemeyer 
(2011). 
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whether corruption deters or encourages FDI.
112
 Thus, it is not clear which sign to expect for 
the corruption variable in our regressions. Descriptive statistics for the variables are provided 
in Table 6 in the Annex, and Table 7 in the Annex gives an overview of the sources of each 
variable used in our analysis. 
Additionally, the quality of the infrastructure of potential host countries is used as a 
control variable (infrastructure). The number of telephone lines per 100 persons serves as a 
proxy to measure the quality of a country‟s infrastructure. Countries with a better 
infrastructure are expected to also be more attractive for Austrian investors. 
 
3.5.4 Estimation Technique 
As mentioned above, logistic and count data regression models based on maximum 
likelihood estimators are the methods used for our analysis. The logistic model is a binary 
response model with the dependent variable being a dummy variable. A prime candidate for 
count data models is the Poisson specification. However, this model requires equidispersion 
in the data, i.e. the mean of the dependent variable should be equal to its variance. As our data 
shows overdispersion, we do not use a Poisson specification, but rather a negative binomial 
model.113 
For both the logistic and the count data specifications, a fixed effects estimation 
including time and country dummy variables was implemented. Thereby, time trends and 
time-invariant country-specific effects such as geographical distance or cultural and historical 
ties are accounted for, which are not captured by our control variables.114  
A problem with such regressions, which is hard to alleviate, is endogeneity due to 
reverse causality or omitted variables, that is, we cannot be sure to measure the effect of 
DTTs on FDI. It could as well be that the regressions actually capture the effect of FDI on 
DTTs, i.e., we actually measure that Austria is more likely to sign a DTT with a country 
where there is already a lot of Austrian FDI.  In order to mitigate this problem, we lag all 
explanatory variables by one period. In addition, the fixed effects estimation method is used 
                                                     
112
 Egger and Winner (2005), for instance, find a positive relation between corruption in the host country and 
FDI. Wei (2000) and Egger and Winner (2006), on the other hand, find that higher levels of corruption deter 
FDI.  
113
 In some count data regressions the alpha-likelihood test indicates equidispersion in the data. In these cases, 
also the Poisson model was estimated. As the results do not change, we decided for the sake of uniformity to use 
the negative binomial model in all count data regressions shown here. Due to the large number or zeros in our 
dependent variable, also a zero-inflated negative binomial model was estimated. The results brought about by the 
zero-inflated negative binomial model do not differ from the results of the negative binomial model. 
114
 also see Barthel et al. (2010). 
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in order to deal with potential endogeneity caused by omitted variables. Thereby, only within-
variation in the data is taken into account and variation from across country-pairs is ignored.115  
In addition, by using fixed effects estimation, countries with which DTTs are in place 
already before the sample period starts (i.e. before 1989) do not impact our estimation results, 
as there is no within-variation in the DTT variable. As countries are likely to sign DTTs with 
countries with which they have had close economic ties at an earlier stage and continue to do 
so, “older treaties are more likely to be correlated with unobserved variables and therefore 
[are more likely to be] endogenous”.116 Thus, excluding old treaties helps to alleviate the 
problem of endogeneity.117 Due to these problems, an upward bias for the DTT dummy in our 
regressions is expected.  
3.6 Estimation Results 
First, we investigate whether having a DTT with Austria makes it more likely that a 
host country receives Austrian FDI. The first two columns in Table 2 show the results of these 
binary choice models. All regressions include time and country fixed effects and a constant. 
The sample in Column (1) includes 38 host countries and covers the years 1990-2011. The 
regression in Column (2), which additionally includes the corruption index of a host country 
as a control variable, covers fewer countries (30) and a smaller time-span (1996-2011) due to 
the availability of the corruption data.
118
   
Our main variable of interest, the dummy variable, stating whether there is a DTT in 
effect between Austria and a host country (DTT_e), is significant and positive in these logit 
regressions. This suggests that potential host countries, which have a DTT with Austria in 
place, are more likely to attract Austrian investment than those that do not.119  
The control variables, which are all lagged by one year, show the expected signs. 
Higher taxes in a host country decrease the likelihood that a developing country receives FDI 
from Austria.120 The positive and statistically significant coefficient of the similarity variable 
indicates that: the more similar a potential host country is to Austria in terms of GDP per 
capita, the more likely it is that Austrian firms invest in that country. The quality of the 
                                                     
115
 Blonigen and Davies (2002). 
116
 Barthel et al. (2010), p. 373. 
117
 See e.g. Blonigen and Davies, 2004. 
118
 The number of countries is so low because there are many countries with no variation in the FDI variable. See 
Table 4 in the Annex for the list of host countries included in the binary choice models. 
119
 It would also be desirable to quantify this effect. However, in logit regressions, only the sign, but not the 
magnitude of the covariates should be interpreted. For many types of logit regressions, marginal effects can be 
calculated, in order to measure the size of the effects. However, for the fixed-effects model, estimated with the 
maximum likelihood method that we implement, this is not possible (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 625). 
120
 We also tested whether the effect of a DTT depends on the level of corporate taxation in the host country, but 
did not find any evidence for this.  
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infrastructure in the host country has the expected positive sign, but is only statistically 
significant in the regression covering the longer time period. Openness to trade of a country 
also has the expected positive sign, but is statistically not significant in the logit regressions. 
The corruption index, spanning from 0 to 100, where greater values indicate a lower level of 
corruption, is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that a lower level of 
corruption increases the likelihood that Austrian firms invest in a specific host country. The 
logistic estimation models thus suggest that having a DTT with Austria makes it more likely 
that a developing country receives Austrian FDI.  
Second, we investigate whether or not DTTs also impact the number of Austrian FDI 
projects in developing countries. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 present the regression results 
for the negative binomial model. The sample in Column (3) covers the years 1990 to 2011 and 
includes 104 countries. In Column (4), the sample also includes the corruption index and 
spans the period 1996-2011, covering 101 countries.121 The regressions again include time and 
country fixed effects as well as a constant. 
As in the logit regressions, the main variable of interest is whether or not there is a 
DTT in place. The count data regressions suggest that developing countries that have a DTT 
in place with Austria are expected to have a 33.7% or 25.2% increase in the number of 
Austrian FDI projects, depending on the model used (see Columns (3) and (4) respectively). 
Evaluated at the mean number of FDI projects, this implies that these developing countries are 
expected to have 0.8 additional FDI projects. This is a sizable effect.122  
The control variables in the count data models are similar to the ones in the logit 
regressions. A higher tax rate discourages Austrian investment. The similarity index and the 
openness of a country have a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of 
Austrian FDI projects in a country. The coefficient of the quality of the infrastructure variable 
is again positive and statistically significant in the larger sample (Column 3). The coefficient 
of the corruption variable indicates that lower levels of corruption cause a country to be more 
attractive for Austrian investors. The count data models thus suggest that developing countries 
with DTT attract more Austrian FDI projects than those without a DTT. 
                                                     
121
 See Annex, Table 5, for the list of countries included in these regressions. In this sample, the number of 
countries is higher than in the logit regressions as the FDI variable in the count data models evidently exhibits 
more within-variation.  
122
 Studies that analyse the impact of DTTs on FDI stocks in developing countries, measured in amounts of 
dollars, find similar results. For instance, Barthel et al. (2010) find that “DTTs increase the bilateral FDI stock 
between 27% and 31%” (p. 367). However, these results cannot be compared directly, because in our study, the 
dependent variable is the number of FDI projects, which are evidently of different sizes. 
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Table 2: Baseline Regression Results  
 
                       logit               count data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
DTT_s 2.877*** 2.280*** 0.337*** 0.252*** 
 (3.45) (2.60) (4.95) (3.69) 
ln_ct -1.259** -1.815** -0.599*** -0.430** 
 (-2.06) (-2.09) (-3.98) (-2.02) 
similarity 19.85*** 32.51** 5.859*** 4.612*** 
 (3.02) (2.50) (7.10) (5.39) 
infrastructure 0.0941** 0.0102 0.0133*** 0.00718 
 (2.28) (0.15) (2.61) (1.32) 
openness 0.790 0.397 0.821*** 0.637*** 
 (1.13) (0.27) (4.27) (2.72) 
corruption  0.0545***  0.0117*** 
  (2.92)  (4.01) 
constant 13.18 14.26 3.060*** 2.833*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (6.19) (4.20) 
year FE yes yes yes yes 
country FE 
yes yes yes yes 
period  1990-2011 1996-2011 1990-2011 1996-2011 
observations 816 459 2133 1383 
no. of countries 38 30 104 101 
pseudo-R
2
 0.46 0.45 0.53 0.54 
log-likelihood -302.04 -173.92 -1370.48 -985.41 
 
Notes: in Columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is binary variable indicating whether or not there is 
Austrian FDI in a given country; in Columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is a count variable 
indicating the number of Austrian FDI projects in a host country. Columns denote coefficients rather 
than odd ratios. All control variables are lagged by one period and the natural logarithm of the corporate 
tax rate is taken. T-statistics in parentheses. Stars denote p-values: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
 
 
3.7 Robustness Tests 
In order to check the robustness of our results, a number of alternative specifications 
were run. The date of signature of a DTT (DTT_s) was trialled instead of the date of 
effectiveness of a DTT (see Annex, Table 8). In place of the similarity index, data on the GDP 
per capita of the host countries (ln_gdppc) was included (see Annex, Table 9). Moreover, the 
population (ln_pop) of host countries was used as a proxy for the host country‟s potential 
market size (see Annex, Table 10). Against our expectations, we do not find a positive and 
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significant effect on FDI. The size of the host country population does not increase the 
number of Austrian FDI projects in a statistically significant way. A reason for this may be 
that relatively small countries like Serbia or Bosnia Herzegovina are among the countries that 
attract the most Austrian FDI.  
For further testing the robustness, our sample was restricted in three different ways 
(see Annex, Tables 11 and 12). First, CEE countries123 that historically attract a large part of 
Austrian OFDI and thus may bias our regressions results were excluded from the regression 
(Columns (1) to (4), Annex, Table 11). Second, B(R)IC countries124, which due to their market 
size and growth rates in the last decades have attracted a lot of FDI regardless of a DTT, were 
also left out (Column (5), Annex, Table 11). Third, our sample of host countries includes ten 
jurisdictions, which are or have been listed as tax havens or offshore centres by the OECD 
and/or the Bank for International Settlements: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Costa Rica, 
Dominica, Grenada, Lebanon, Liberia, Mauritius, Panama and Uruguay.
125
 In the robustness 
tests, these countries are excluded from the sample of potential host countries, as investing in 
these countries may arguably be motivated by other factors when compared to investing in 
“normal” developing countries (Annex, Table 12). All these alternative specifications confirm 
the results of our baseline regressions, that there is a positive relationship between DTTs and 
Austrian investment projects in developing countries. 
 
3.8 Discussion 
The econometric analysis presented here suggests that DTTs significantly encourage 
Austrian FDI activity in developing countries. As Austria mainly has DTTs with middle-
income countries126 (except for Tajikistan and Nepal), our results are in line with Neumayer 
(2007), who also finds that the presence of DTTs triggers increased FDI in middle-income 
countries. Our results suggest that the number of Austrian investment projects in middle 
income countries increases by 25.2% to 33.7% when a DTT is in place.  
                                                     
123
 The CEE countries in our sample are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. 
124
 Brazil, China, and India; Russia is not included in our sample of host countries. 
125
 Costa Rica and Uruguay were in the OECD “List of Jurisdictions That Have Not Committed to the 
Internationally Agreed Tax Standards”. Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Liberia, and Panama 
were included in the OECD “List of Jurisdictions That Have Committed to the Internationally Agreed Tax 
Standard, But Have Not Yet Substantially Implemented It”. Lebanon and Mauritius are in the list of offshore 
centres published by the Bank of International Settlements (see Hebous, 2014). Additionally, also Malaysia and 
the Philippines were in the OECD “List of Jurisdictions That Have Not Committed to the Internationally Agreed 
Tax Standards”, but these two countries are large countries, which may attract investment also for economic 
reasons; thus we decided to leave them in the sample. 
126
 As of July 2013, according to the World Bank (2013), middle-income countries are defined as having a Gross 
National Income per capita of between 1,036 USD and 12,615 USD.  
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However, these figures should be taken with some caution. First, even though we tried 
to mitigate the concerns of endogeneity in the analysis, they are arguably not entirely solved. 
Thus, it is not totally clear, whether DTTs trigger more FDI or whether rather Austria signs 
DTTs with countries where Austrian firms are active. As we expect an upward bias due to 
these endogeneity problems, the actual effect may be smaller than the regression results 
suggest. 
Second, the method used captures short term-effects only. In the long run, the impact 
of DTTs on FDI may be different. According to a recent study of the Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis (CBP) DTTs only have a temporary positive effect. The CBP study 
suggests that “[t]he average effect of a new treaty reaches a peak at almost 35% higher 
bilateral FDI stocks after six years, but becomes insignificant after eleven years.”127  
It should also be considered that about a third of Austrian FDI projects in developing 
countries are effectuated by companies that have a parent in a third countries. As seen in 
Section 3.1, international firms use their Austrian subsidiaries for investing in other countries, 
including developing countries. In the econometric analysis above, it is impossible to prove or 
discredit whether firms invest in a respective developing country via Austria are doing so 
simply because of a DTT between Austria and a respective developing country. That is, our 
results may capture some treaty shopping128, which could also lead to an overestimation of the 
effect of DTTs on FDIs originating in Austria.129 The reader is advised to take all these 
matters into consideration when examining the results of this economic analysis. 
  
                                                     
127
 Weyzig (2013), p. 62. 
128
 IBFD Tax Research Platform Glossary defines treaty shopping as “as the situation where a person who is not 
entitled to the benefits of a tax treaty makes use – in the widest meaning of the word – of an individual or of a 
legal person in order to obtain those treaty benefits that are not available directly. 
129
 Also see Weyzig (2013). There are studies that find empirical evidence that treaty shopping takes place (e.g. 
Mintz and Weichenrieder, 2008; Dreßler, 2012; Weyzig, 2012). We are, however, not aware of any evidence that 
the Austrian DTT network is used for treaty shopping purposes. Lang (2012) sees a risk that the inclusion of 
provisions regarding the waiving of the withholding taxation of residents in Austria‟s tax treaties with countries 
that used to be considered as tax havens may provide incentives to shift profits out of Austria into third countries 
via these partner countries, that tax income at a very low rate or not at all (p. 115). Steiner (2013) provides 
anecdotal evidence that Austria is being used as a conduit country for routing profits generated in a 
multinational‟s European affiliates overseas. According to Steiner, this routing via Austria takes place not 
because of the Austrian DTT network but because overall the Austrian tax system is so attractive for 
multinationals (also see Section 2.1). 
  
32 
 
4. Conclusions  
This study investigates the effects developing countries may expect when signing a 
DTT with Austria. Our economic analysis suggests that the signature of a DTT with Austria 
encourages Austrian FDI activity in middle-income countries. This is achieved in a number of 
ways, as listed below.  
Signing a DTT helps to avoid double taxation. However, as Austria‟s domestic tax law 
contains provisions which allow preventing double taxation unilaterally, this seems not to be 
the only (or main) impetus for increasing FDI activity. DTTs also signal legal certainty for 
potential investors. Legal certainty is, however, not achieved solely by signing a DTT, but 
through the interplay of a DTT with a comprehensive, transparent, and stable domestic tax 
system.  
In addition, reduced withholding tax rates on passive income as compared with the 
domestic tax rates may contribute to attract FDI. Austria‟s policy goal is to reduce 
withholding tax rates as much as possible (even below the rates proposed by the OECD). 
Moreover, Austria‟s treaty policy also includes to propose a “most favoured nation clause”, 
which may lead to further tax rate reductions in the future. However, such reduced 
withholding tax rates may also imply downsides for a source country. As withholding tax 
rates can help to mitigate profit shifting by MNEs,130 having no or very low source taxation 
creates opportunities for tax avoidance. Additionally, capital-importing countries risk losing 
tax revenues, if the increased FDI inflows are not large enough to make up for revenue that is 
lost.  
 Curbing tax avoidance is also a frequently mentioned effect of DTTs. However, anti-
abuse clauses in DTTs can only curb tax-planning possibilities to a certain point, namely 
those opportunities which are created by the application of the DTTs themselves. In any case, 
as Austria‟s policy is not to include anti-avoidance provisions in DTTs, but to apply anti-
avoidance provisions contained in its domestic law, this point does not apply to the DTTs 
between Austria and developing countries. 
Furthermore, DTTs help to mitigate tax evasion, as they provide for the exchange of 
information and administrative cooperation between tax administrations. However, by signing 
TIEAs and the Multilateral Convention, countries can often achieve the same purposes. For 
developing countries, these tax agreements may even be more beneficial alternatives to 
exchange information, as they do not shift taxation rights to the residence country. Moreover, 
                                                     
130
 “In particular, withholding taxes on interest, royalties, and management fees form a barrier against profit 
shifting to low-tax affiliates by multinational firms” (Weyzig, 2013, p. 42).  
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the multilateral approach of the Mutual Assistance Convention is an advantage in the fight 
against tax avoidance and evasion, as it also provides, at least in theory, a “level playing 
field”. Similar rules apply to all signatory states and information can be exchanged with third 
countries. Austria has already ratified the Multilateral Convention. Once it will enter into 
force (as of December 2014) developing countries can also request assistance in the field of 
tax collection from Austria under this Convention without a need to sign a DTT. 
On another note, the exchange of information on request (as established in DTTs) does 
not always alleviate the problem of tax evasion. For example, wealthy individuals can hide 
their money in bank accounts abroad, which is a problem for both developed and developing 
countries; however developing countries that have weaker tax administrations may arguably 
suffer more from this form of tax evasion.131 Information being exchanged only on request 
requires countries to provide information to identify the taxpayer under examination. 
Acknowledging that this is a complicated task, we would argue that through the automatic 
exchange of information, could one curb the problem of tax evasion to a greater degree.132  
From the arguments provided above, it becomes clear that signing a DTT with Austria 
entails both potential benefits and risks for developing countries. It would be advisable for 
developing countries to conduct DTT impact analyses in order to be able to estimate their 
potential effects. Such analyses could also shed light on which provisions to be included or 
adapted to achieve desired goals. 
Also for Austria, the results of this study are relevant. The growing 
internationalization of the Austrian economy implies that its international tax policy impacts 
other countries. Like all member states of the European Union, Austria has subscribed to 
“policy coherence”: Austria commits to consider the goals and principles of its developmental 
policy in all policy areas that affect developing countries.133 In the light of this “policy 
coherence” principle, Austria might, for example, need to re-examine how its DTT policy 
with regard to withholding tax rates affects resource mobilization in developing countries. 
Finally, there is ample room for further research. Most economic studies, including the 
present one, assume all tax treaties to be identical. However, even though they may be very 
similar in structure, each DTT is different. It is surprising that still little is known about how 
                                                     
131
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that such money is also in bank accounts in Austria, that has a very stable 
political environment and (used to) offer bank secrecy (see e.g. Skjönsberg (2012); Huter (2014); Höller (2014)).  
132
 Also see McGauran (2012): “The inclusion of information exchange agreements does not ensure detection of 
evasion and avoidance. On-request information exchange (…) typically fails to detect tax avoidance and evasion 
because strong indications need to exist to be able request information from another tax authority” (p. 19). 
133
 Austria has embraced the principle of policy coherence in its national law: §1 Zi 5 EZA-G “Der Bund 
berücksichtigt die Ziele und Prinzipien der Entwicklungspolitik bei den von ihm verfolgten Politikbereichen, 
welche die Entwicklungsländer berühren können.“ 
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these different types of DTTs impact on FDI. In addition, as already indicated above, further 
empirical evidence on how DTTs affect tax revenues of signatory states is needed. Corporate 
taxes, as well as withholding taxes, can be a significant source of revenue for developing 
countries.134 Also, case studies analysing the benefits and disadvantages of individual DTTs 
could be very insightful. However, not least because of the scarcity of available data, 
conducting such studies may be very challenging. 
 
  
                                                     
134
 For instance, in 1997, withholding tax revenues made up 3% of GDP in Brazil, while corporate tax revenues 
excluding withholding taxes accounted for 3.7% (Weyzig, 2013, p. 40). McGauran (2013) undertook an effort to 
estimate the tax revenue losses due to DTTs signed between developing countries and the Netherlands. 
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5. Annex  
 
Table 3: List of Effective Austrian DTTs with Developing Countries 
Albania (2009) Mexico (2006) 
Algeria (2007) Moldova, Republic of (2006) 
Armenia (2005) Mongolia (2005) 
Azerbaijan (2002) Morocco (2007) 
Belarus (2003) Nepal (2003) 
Belize (2004) Pakistan (1968) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (2012) Philippines (1983) 
Brazil (1977) Serbia, Republic of (2011) 
China (1993) South Africa (1998) 
Cuba (2007) Tajikistan* (1979) 
Egypt (1961) Thailand (1987) 
Georgia (2007) Tunisia (1979) 
India (2002) Turkey (1974) 
Indonesia (1989) Turkmenistan* (1979) 
Iran, Islamic Republic of (2005) Ukraine (2000) 
Kazakhstan (2007) Uzbekistan (2002) 
Kyrgyzstan (2004) Venezuela (2008) 
Macedonia (2008) Vietnam (2011) 
Malaysia (1988)  
 
Note: Years in parentheses depict years when DTT becomes applicable; *old DTT with USSR applicable until 
new DTT signed (Tajikistan: new DTT signed in 2011, applicable as of 2013) 
 
Source: Austrian Ministry of Finance 
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Table 4: Countries Included in Binary Choice Models 
Albania
a  
 Grenada
a
 Mozambique 
Algeria  Guatemala Namibia
a
 
Antigua and Barbuda
a
 Honduras Nicaragua 
Armenia  Iran Nigeria 
Azerbaijan  Jordan Pakistan
a 
 
Belarus  Kazakhstan Panama 
Chile Libya Paraguay 
Costa Rica Macedonia
a
 Peru
a
 
Cuba  Malaysia
a 
 Tunisia  
Ecuador Mauritius Turkey  
Egypt  Mexico  Uzbekistan  
Georgia  Moldova  Vietnam  
Ghana Morocco   
 
Note: Countries marked with an 
a
 are not included in the corruption index 
 
Table 5: Countries Included in Count Data Models 
Afghanistan
a
 Congo, Rep. of Jamaica Pakistan 
Albania  Costa Rica Jordan Panama 
Algeria  Cuba  Kazakhstan  Papua New Guinea 
Angola Djibouti Kenya Paraguay 
Antigua and Barbuda
a
 Dominica
a
 Kyrgyz Republic  Peru 
Argentina  Dominican Republic Lebanon Philippines  
Armenia  Ecuador Lesotho Rwanda 
Azerbaijan  Egypt  Liberia Senegal 
Bangladesh El Salvador Libya  Serbia  
Belarus  Equatorial Guinea Macedonia Sierra Leone 
Belize  Eritrea Malawi South Africa  
Benin  Ethiopia Malaysia  Sudan 
Bhutan Gabon Mali Suriname 
Bolivia Gambia Mauritania Syrian Arab Republic  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  Georgia  Mauritius Tajikistan  
Botswana Ghana Mexico  Thailand  
Brazil  Grenada
a
 Moldova  Tunisia  
Burkina Faso Guatemala Mongolia  Turkey  
Burundi Guinea Montenegro Turkmenistan  
Cambodia Guinea-Bissau Morocco  Uganda 
Cameroon Guyana Mozambique Ukraine  
Central African 
Republic Haiti Namibia Uzbekistan  
Chad Honduras Nepal  Venezuela  
Chile  India  Nicaragua Vietnam  
China  Indonesia  Niger Zambia 
Colombia Iran  Nigeria Zimbabwe 
 
Note: Countries marked with an 
a
 are not included in the models including the corruption index 
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Table 6: Summary Statistics 
Variable 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minumum Maximum 
          
logit 1990-2011 (816 observations)        
FDI_d 0.44 0.50 0 1 
DTT_e 0.24 0.43 0 1 
ln_ct 2.60 0.39 1.58 3.77 
similarity 0.09 0.07 0.004 0.42 
infrastructure 11.60 9.69 0.12 49.32 
openness 0.82 0.38 0.24 2.12 
          
logit 1996-2011 (459 observations)        
FDI_d 0.47 0.50 0 1 
DTT_e 0.27 0.45 0 1 
ln_ct 2.56 0.37 1.61 3.69 
similarity 0.08 0.06 0.007 0.31 
infrastructure 12.24 8.82 0.32 43.13 
openness 0.83 0.32 0.25 1.78 
corruption 31.42 15.19 7 79 
          
count data 1990-2011 (2133 observations)    
FDI 2.42 9.82 0 126 
DTT_e 0.20 0.40 0 1 
ln_ct 2.60 0.45 0.72 4.24 
similarity 0.06 0.07 0.004 0.48 
infrastructure 7.84 8.84 0.017 49.32 
openness 0.76 0.39 0.04 2.89 
         
count data 1996-2011 (1383 observations)      
FDI 3.18 11.19 0 126 
DTT_e 0.26 0.44 0 1 
ln_ct 2.55 0.42 0.72 3.75 
similarity 0.06 0.06 0.004 0.48 
infrastructure 8.52 8.37 0.06 43.13 
openness 0.77 0.37 0.08 2.12 
corruption 28.98 13.87 4 79 
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Table 7: Data Sources of the Variables Used in the Regression Analysis 
 
Variable 
 
Explanation 
 
Source 
 
FDI 
 
Number of Austrian investments 
in a given country in a given year 
 
 
Austrian National Bank 
(OeNB Statistische 
Sonderauswertung) 
FDI_d Dummy of whether or not there is 
an Austrian investment in a given 
country in a given year 
 
Austrian National Bank 
(OeNB Statistische 
Sonderauswertung) 
DTT_s Dummy equal to 1 in the year a 
DTT is signed btw Austria and 
the respective partner country; 
also 1 in all subsequent years  
 
 
IBFD and Austrian Ministry 
of Finance 
DTT_e Dummy equal to 1 in the year a 
DTT btw Austria and the 
respective partner country 
becomes effective; also 1 in all 
subsequent years 
 
IBFD and Austrian Ministry 
of Finance 
similarity  “Similarity is an index, defined 
as one minus the ratio of the 
absolute value of GDP per capita 
minus GDP per capita in 
[Austria], relative to the higher of 
both GDPs per capita” (Overesch 
and Wamser, 2009: 1670). 
 
own calculation; based on UN 
GDP data 
infrastructure Telephone lines (per 100 people) World Bank, World 
Development Indicators, 
available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/data
-catalog/world-development-
indicators 
 
corruption Index ranging from 0 to 100, 
where 0 means very corrupt and 
100 very little corrupt 
Heritage Foundation, avail. at: 
http://www.heritage.org/index
/explore?view=by-region-
country-year 
 
gdppc 
 
GDP per capita United Nations 
openness (Exports +imports)/gdp Penn World Table 8.0 
(Feenstra et al., 2013) 
 
corporate tax rate Host country corporate tax rate; 
proxied by general government 
final consumption expenditure as 
a percentage of GDP 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators, 
available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/data
-catalog/world-development-
indicators 
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Table 8: Robustness Test 1. Date of signature of DTT 
                       logit               count data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
DTT_s 3.293*** 4.106*** 0.320*** 0.256*** 
 (4.10) (4.07) (4.59) (3.27) 
ln_ct -1.368** -2.215** -0.652*** -0.520** 
 (-2.19) (-2.44) (-4.36) (-2.32) 
similarity 20.50*** 21.69* 6.069*** 4.702*** 
 (3.10) (1.75) (7.18) (5.20) 
infrastructure 0.0801* -0.0633 0.0134** 0.00640 
 (1.91) (-0.89) (2.53) (1.16) 
openness 0.438 -1.073 0.891*** 0.769*** 
 (0.61) (-0.69) (4.60) (3.27) 
corruption  0.0541***  0.00995*** 
  (2.79)  (3.27) 
constant 14.54 18.21 3.138*** 3.074*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (6.29) (4.51) 
year FE yes yes yes yes 
country FE yes yes yes yes 
period  1990-2011 1996-2011 1990-2011 1996-2011 
observations 816 459 2133 1383 
no. of countries 30 38 104 101 
pseudo-R
2
 0.47 0.48 0.53 0.55 
log-likelihood -296.49 -165.62 -1371.58 -986.64 
 
Notes: dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is a binary variable dependent variable indicating 
whether or not there is Austrian FDI in a host country; dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is a 
count variable indicating the number of Austrian FDI projects in a host country; columns denote 
coefficients; all control variables are lagged by one period and the natural logarithm of the corporate tax 
rate is taken; t statistics in parentheses; stars denote p-values: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; 
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Table 9: Robustness Test 2. GDP per Capita 
                       logit               count data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
DTT_e 2.958*** 2.313*** 0.314*** 0.240*** 
 (3.49) (2.65) (4.63) (3.40) 
ln_ct -1.245** -1.884** -0.530*** -0.379 
 (-1.99) (-2.13) (-3.38) (-1.61) 
ln_gdppc 1.272** 1.874** 0.609*** 0.472*** 
 (2.38) (2.26) (6.47) (4.30) 
infrastructure 0.103** 0.0223 0.00394 -0.00112 
 (2.51) (0.34) (0.72) (-0.18) 
openness 0.730 0.209 0.852*** 0.681*** 
 (1.04) (0.14) (4.41) (2.76) 
corruption  0.0606***  0.0109*** 
  (3.22)  (3.71) 
constant 4.020 2.339 -1.294 -0.483 
 (0.01) (0.00) (-1.28) (-0.39) 
year FE yes yes yes yes 
country FE yes yes yes yes 
period  1990-2011 1996-2011 1990-2011 1996-2011 
observations 816 459 2133 1383 
no. of countries 30 38 104 101 
pseudo-R
2
 0.46 0.45 0.53 0.55 
log-likelihood -303.94 -174.89 -1374.41 -989.58 
 
Notes: dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is a binary variable indicating whether or not there is 
Austrian FDI in a host country; dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is a count variable indicating 
the number of Austrian FDI projects in a host country; columns denote coefficients; all control variables 
are lagged by one period and the natural logarithm of the corporate tax rate is taken; t statistics in 
parentheses; stars denote p-values: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; 
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Table 10: Robustness Test 3. Inclusion of Population as Control Variable 
                       logit               count data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
DTT_e 2.896*** 1.962** 0.222*** 0.185*** 
 (3.39) (2.12) (3.29) (2.63) 
ln_ct -1.261** -1.754** -0.560*** -0.276 
 (-2.06) (-2.00) (-3.69) (-1.25) 
similarity 19.86*** 30.36** 5.611*** 4.567*** 
 (3.02) (2.33) (7.07) (5.34) 
ln_pop 0.219 -4.287 -2.121*** -2.202*** 
 (0.11) (-1.00) (-4.76) (-3.86) 
infrastructure 0.0947** -0.00274 0.00209 -0.00333 
 (2.27) (-0.04) (0.40) (-0.55) 
openness 0.791 0.221 0.853*** 0.845*** 
 (1.13) (0.15) (4.49) (3.50) 
corruption  0.0512***  0.0115*** 
  (2.72)  (3.94) 
constant 9.676 93.13 41.76*** 42.50*** 
 (0.01) (0.13) (5.13) (4.13) 
year FE yes yes yes yes 
country FE yes yes yes yes 
period  1990-2011 1996-2011 1990-2011 1996-2011 
observations 816 459 2111 1377 
no. of countries 30 38 103 100 
pseudo-R
2
 0.46 0.45 0.53 0.55 
log-likelihood -302.03 -173.41 -1359.31 -977.76 
 
Notes: dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is a binary variable indicating whether or not there is 
Austrian FDI in a host country; dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is a count variable indicating 
the number of Austrian FDI projects in a host country; columns denote coefficients; all control variables 
are lagged by one period and the natural logarithm of the corporate tax rate is taken; t statistics in 
parentheses; stars denote p-values: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; 
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Table 11: Robustness Test 4. Exclusion of CEECs and the B(R)IC 
 no CEECs no B(R)IC 
 logit count data count data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
DTT_e 2.909*** 2.280*** 0.373*** 0.256*** 0.242*** 
 (3.49) (2.60) (4.58) (2.87) (3.67) 
ln_ct -1.462** -1.815** -0.555*** -0.489** -0.548*** 
 (-2.29) (-2.09) (-3.39) (-1.99) (-3.69) 
similarity 19.85*** 32.51** 5.731*** 4.497*** 8.915*** 
 (3.03) (2.50) (6.50) (4.76) (10.04) 
infrastructure 0.0861** 0.0102 0.0201*** 0.00814  
 (2.12) (0.15) (3.55) (1.39)  
openness 0.594 0.397 0.729*** 0.475* 1.249*** 
 (0.83) (0.27) (3.42) (1.83) (7.21) 
corruption  0.0545***  0.0128***  
  (2.92)  (3.84)  
constant 14.46 14.26 2.785*** 3.011*** 2.678*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (5.18) (4.00) (5.64) 
year FE yes yes yes yes yes 
country FE yes yes yes yes yes 
period 1990-2011 1996-2011 1990-2011 1996-2011 1990-2011 
observations 773 459 2068 1345 2093 
no. of countries 36 30 99 96 101 
pseudo-R
2
 0.45 0.45 0.53 0.55 0.53 
log-likelihood -289.88 -173.92 -1222.81 -896.91 -1203.02 
 
Notes: dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is a binary variable indicating whether or not there is 
Austrian FDI in a host country; dependent variable in columns (3)to (5) is a count variable indicating the 
number of Austrian FDI projects in a host country; columns denote coefficients; all control variables are 
lagged by one period and the natural logarithm of the corporate tax rate is taken; t statistics in parentheses, 
stars denote p-values: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; 
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Table 12: Robustness Test 6. Exclusion of Tax Haven Countries 
                       logit               count data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
DTT_e 3.351*** 2.146** 0.345*** 0.251*** 
 (3.87) (2.39) (4.99) (3.69) 
ln_ct -1.058* -1.856** -0.541*** -0.437** 
 (-1.67) (-2.04) (-3.52) (-2.04) 
similarity 26.72*** 59.84*** 6.113*** 4.679*** 
 (3.20) (3.46) (7.11) (5.45) 
infrastructure 0.0893 0.0231 0.0145*** 0.00724 
 (1.56) (0.30) (2.77) (1.32) 
openness 3.473*** 2.048 1.166*** 0.641*** 
 (3.44) (1.18) (5.53) (2.70) 
corruption  0.0633***  0.0116*** 
  (3.13)  (3.95) 
constant 10.71 10.46 2.644*** 2.836*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (5.14) (4.18) 
year FE yes yes yes yes 
country FE yes yes yes yes 
period  1990-2011 1996-2011 1990-2011 1996-2011 
observations 706 415 1950 1304 
no. of countries 33 27 95 94 
pseudo-R
2
 0.49 0.49 0.54 0.55 
log-likelihood -248.32 -146.86 -1263.21 -947.37 
 
Notes: dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is a binary variable indicating whether or not there is 
Austrian FDI in a host country; dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is a count variable indicating 
the number of Austrian FDI projects in a host country; columns denote coefficients; all control variables 
are lagged by one period and the natural logarithm of the corporate tax rate is taken; t statistics in 
parentheses; stars denote p-values: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; 
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